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Why an Employer Does Not Have to Answer for
Preventing an Employee with a Disability from Utilizing
Corrective Measures: The Relationship Between
Mitigation and Reasonable Accommodation*
I. INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") of 1990, 1 one of the enumerated purposes of the statute was to
eliminate "discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 2 Various
obstacles have prevented the ADA from fully accomplishing that purpose. Restrictive judicially created standards for summary judgment in
ADA claims for employment discrimination have severely inhibited
many disabled individuals' opportunities to receive redress.
A threshold question in an ADA claim for employment discrimination is whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability.'' 3
This Note addresses a current loophole for employers. If a claimant can
utilize mitigating measures to correct her disability but her employer
prevents her from doing so, an ADA suit by that claimant may not survive summary judgment because the claimant may not be a "qualified
individual with a disability." Part II provides an overview of the employment portion of the ADA and recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the Act, focusing on what is necessary for a plaintiff to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Part Ill explores Nawrot v. CPC International, 4 the primary case of this Note. Nawrot is an ADA employment
discrimination case filed in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois in which the plaintiff failed to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Part IV argues for a single qualification test
to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies to bring an ADA employment
discrimination claim, rather than the currently employed bifurcated
qualification test. Nawrot provides one example of how this test could

*
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I. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. ~ 1210l(b)(l).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
4. No. 99 C 630, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2000).
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close the loophole for employers who prohibit employees from utilizing
mitigating measures to correct disabilities. Part V summarizes the differences between the single qualification test and the bifurcated qualification test.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress declared in the ADA that "historically, society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities," 5 that such discrimination continues "to be a serious and pervasive social problem," 6
that "individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination,"7 that individuals with disabilities have been "relegated to a position
of political powerlessness in our society ... resulting from stereotypic
assumptions," 8 and that "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis."9 One enumerated purpose of the
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of unnecessary discrimination against individuals with disabilities."10 Title I of the ADA deals with employment. 11

A. The Bifurcated Qualification Test
The general rule of Title I provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individua1." 12 Federal courts have established that for a
claimant to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination by
an employer, she must establish: "(1) that she is disabled within the
meaning of the [ADA]; (2) that she is qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job either with or without accommodation; and (3) that
she has suffered adverse employment action because of the disability." 13

5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
6. !d.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l).
II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
13. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Benson
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995)). See also White v. York Int'1 Corp.,
45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (lOth Cir. 1995); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209,212 (4th Cir.
1994); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385,
1390 (5th Cir. 1993); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 640-42 (2d Cir. 1991); Lucero v. Hart, 915
F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990).
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This Note refers to the first two prongs of that three part test as the bifurcated qualification test because it bifurcates, or splits, the "qualified individual with a disability" 14 standard of the ADA into two tests: (1)
whether a claimant has a disability, and (2) whether that claimant is a
qualified individual.
It is difficult to meet the bifurcated qualification test of first establishing that the claimant has a disability and then that the claimant is a
qualified individual. As a result, most ADA claims for employment discrimination do not survive summary judgment. No single explanation
can completely explain that phenomena, but it is certain that current
ADA case law establishes a high threshold for a plaintiff to get a claim
before a jury. 15 Because motions for summary judgment are so prevalent
in ADA cases, this Note's primary focus is on one of the many instances
in which a claimant loses an ADA case on summary judgment.
The initial question in the bifurcated qualification test, determining
whether an individual has a disability, relies on the ADA definition of
"disability." This definition includes: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 16 Often, the most difficult hurdle
for plaintiffs is to establish that their disability limits a major life activ.
17
Jty.

B. Surviving Summary Judgment Under the ADA: Mitigation
Prior to 1999, the legislative history of the ADA, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines, and federal case law created uncertainty regarding whether a court, when determining whether an

14. 42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(X).
15. Compare Ruth Calker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Wind{allfiJr Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L Rrov. 99, 101 (1999) (noting that 93% of ADA cases in U.S. District Courts
and 84'Y,, at the appellate level bring results tor defendants, asserting that federal judges "are abusing
the summary judgment device and failing to defer to agency guidance in interpreting the ADA."),
with JctTrcy A. Van Della & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintij(1·
Losing Summwy Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better BefiJre a Jury? A Response to
Professor Colker, 19 REV. LiTI<i. 505 (2000) (arguing that one reason for the high summary judgment rate in ADA cases is inadequate representation by plaintiffs' attorneys).
16. 42 U.S. C. ~ 121 02(2)(A)-(C). This Note does not address the unique issues involved in
defining a disability under each of these three tests, but rather focuses on how to define a condition
that substantially limits a major life activity. That definition is crucial to all three tests.
17. For example, the law is not entirely clear about whether "working" qualifies as a major
life activity. While the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) takes the position that
under certain circumstances working does qualify as a major life activity, see 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000), the Supreme Court has declined to rule definitively on the issue. See, e.g.,
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999) ("Assuming without deciding that working is a
major life activity ... ").
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an individual has a disability, should consider mitigating measures that
an individual can utilize to correct her impairment's The legislative history of the ADA contains statements that could support either result. 19
EEOC guidelines prior to 1999 favored evaluating a disability without
reference to mitigating measures. 2° Federal courts were split. Most circuits followed the EEOC position, including the First, Second, Third,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 21 The Sixth and Tenth
Circuits ruled contrary to the EEOC position, holding that disability
analysis requires consideration of mitigating measures. 22 The Supreme
Court settled the issue in 1999 with the "Sutton Trilogy." 23
1. Sutton

In Sutton, petitioners with severe myopia were not hired by United
Airlines because of a requirement mandating uncorrected visual acuity of
201100 or better?4 The petitioners brought an ADA action alleging that

18. See Timothy S. Bland & Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., US Supreme Court Resolves Mitigating
Measures Issue Under the ADA, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. I, 7-15 ( 1999); Joshua C. Dickinson. Will the
Supreme Court Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures not Present~v Utilized by Employees When Determining Whether a '"Disability .. Exists Under Section A o/the ADA"·
68 UMKC L. REV. 389,391-94 (2000); Perry Meadows, M.D. & Richard A. Bales. Using Mitigating
Measures to Determine Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 S.D. L. REV. 33,
39-44 (2000); Stacie E. Barhorst, Note, What Does Disability Mean: The Americans with /)isabilities Act o/1990 in the Afiermath o/Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 137, 138151 (1999).
19. The House Labor Report on the ADA states that a disability "should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodation or auxiliary
aids." H.R. REP. No. I 01-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990). The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report contains an identical statement, but further indicates that the focus should be on the effects of the impairment, rather than the qualities of the impairment. S. REP. No. I01-1 16. at 22-24
( 1989). See also Bland & Walsh, supra note 18, at 7-8; Meadows & Bales, supra note I X, at 39-40.
20. "[T]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2Ul ( 1998). The EEOC deleted this
statement from the regulations in 2000. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2Ul (2000).
21. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998); Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321,329 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated in part by Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624 (8th Cir. 1997); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997);
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (lith Cir. 1996). See also Bland & Walsh, supra
note 18, at 12-15; Dickinson, supra note 18, at 393-94; Meadows & Bales, supra note 18, at 42-43;
Barhorst, supra note 18, at 146-48.
22. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1997); Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (lOth Cir. 1997). See also Bland & Walsh, supra note 18, at 10-12;
Dickinson, supra note 18, at 393-94; Meadows & Bales, supra note 18, at 43; Barhorst, supra note
18, at 148-50.
23. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 ( 1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 ( 1999). See also Meadows
& Bales, supra note 18, at 44 (referring to the "Sutton Trilogy").
24. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
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they had an impairment that substantially limited them in the major life
activity of working, and that they were regarded as having such an impairment.25 The District Court granted summary judgment for United
Airlines because the petitioners could correct their vision and thus were
not substantially limited in any major life activity? 6 In addition, the
Court stated that "petitioners had alleged only that respondent regarded
them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular job," therefore
they "had not stated a claim that they were regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity ofworking." 27 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed.n
The Supreme Court also affirmed, with Justice O'Connor writing for
the majority, stating that "disability under the [ADA] is to be determined
29
with reference to corrective measures." The majority rejected the
30
EEOC guidelines as "an impermissible interpretation of the ADA," noting that because "by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner,
we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." 31
Justice 0 'Connor provided three reasons for this decision. 32 First,
because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the definition of
"disability" in the "present indicative verb form," 33 that term requires
"that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited. " 34 Second, because the "disability" definition requires an
evaluation of "whether an impairment substantially limits the 'major life
activities of such individual, "'35 that evaluation should be an individualized one. 36 Evaluating individuals without reference to mitigation would
require treating individuals "as members of a group of people with similar impairments, rather than as individuals."37 Justice O'Connor also
pointed out that a failure to consider mitigating measures would preclude
consideration of any negative side effects of mitigation, a result "inconsistent with the individualized approach of the ADA." 3x Third, the Court
noted that in the findings of the ADA, Congress found that "some
25.
26.
27.
2X.
29.
30.
ll.
32.
13.
34.
35.
36.
37.
3X.

Sec id
Sec id
!d. at476-77.
Sec id at 4 77.
!d. at 4XX.
Sec supa note 20 and accompanying text.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4X2.
See id
/J. Seealso42 U.S.C. ~ 12102(2)(A)(I994).
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4X2.
ld at4X3 (quoting42 U.S.C. ~ 12102(2)).
Sec id (citations omitted).
!d. at 4X3.
ld at 4X4.
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43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities."39 Concluding that this figure is inconsistent with a definition of
"disability" that does not consider mitigating measures, the majority
evaluated statistics and reports to support that position. 40
Justice O'Connor then evaluated whether the petitioners were regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The
EEOC recognizes work as a major life activity, but defines "substantially
limited" in that context as being:
[S]ignificantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity ofworking. 41

"Assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity and
that the EEOC regulations interpreting the term 'substantially limits' are
reasonable," 42 the majority concluded that the petitioners' impairment
did not meet the EEOC standard.43 While the petitioners alleged that
United Airlines regarded their impairment as preventing them from holding "global airline pilot" positions, that single job did not qualify as a
class or broad range of jobs, particularly where the petitioners were not
precluded from other types of pilot jobs. 44
2. Murphy

In addition to clarifying other aspects of ADA law, the Supreme
Court applied the mitigation doctrine to two specific circumstances in the
other cases of the Sutton Trilogy. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., the Court classified the petitioner's blood pressure medication as a
mitigating measure that a court must consider when determining whether
the petitioner had a disability. 45

3. Albertson's
In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the petitioner suffered from "amblyopia, an uncorrectable condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in

39. !d. (quoting42 U.S.C. 12IOI(a)(l)).
40. See id. at 484-88.
41. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)). See also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000) (containing the same guideline).
42. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
43. See id. at 493.
44. See id.
45. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516,521 (1999).
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his left eye and monocular vision in effect." 46 After addressing other issues, the majority pointed out that subconscious mechanisms for coping
with an impairment constitute mitigating measures, noting that "[ w ]e see
no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with
artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems."47 The majority pointed out that monocularity must be proved as a disability with reference to an individual's "own experience."4 ~
C. Surviving Summary Judgment Under the ADA: Reasonable

Accommodation
The ADA requires an evaluation of reasonable accommodation at
two levels of a claim. If a claimant demonstrates that she has a disability
under the ADA, she still must establish that she is a "qualified individual
with a disability" to survive summary judgment. 49 The ADA defines a
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires." 50 Additionally, the ADA definition of "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommodations" for the employee
unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." 51 The ADA provides some examples of what reasonable accommodation may require. 52
Thus, to survive summary judgment against the claimant, that claimant may have to provide evidence of reasonable accommodations that
would enable her to "perform the essential functions" of the job. 53 Addi46.
47.
4X.
49.
50.

Albertson's, Inc. v Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559 ( 1999).
/d. at 565-66.
/d. at567.
42 U.S.C.§ 12lii(S) (1994).

/d.

51. 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
52. The ADA docs not specifically define reasonable accommodation, but states thai it "'may
include":
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B). The ADA also provides guidelines for what constitutes an "undue
hardship." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (I 0).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12lii(R).
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tionally, a claimant can demonstrate substantive discrimination by establishing that her employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations. 54
This Note does not address the second evaluation of reasonable accommodation, instead focusing on how it affects whether a claimant is a
"qualified individual with a disability." 55
The Supreme Court recently addressed reasonable accommodation as
part of the prima facie case in an ADA employment claim in Cleveland
v. Policy Management Systems Corp. 56 The lower courts had granted
summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff had, in a separate action, applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging in that
claim that she was unable to work. 57 The lower courts had reasoned that
because the plaintiff had alleged she was unable to work in the Social
Security context, the courts should apply a presumption that she is not
able to "perform the essential functions" of the job in the ADA context. 5 8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Social Security claim
and the ADA claim are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 59 One of the
reasons for the reversal was that while the ADA requires courts to consider reasonable accommodation when determining whether a claimant
can "perform the essential functions" of the job, the Social Security Administration does not consider any reasonable accommodations when determining whether an individual is able to work. 60 Nevertheless, the
Court affirmed the position that to survive summary judgment in an
ADA claim, a claimant must establish that she can "perform the essential
functions [of the job], at least with 'reasonable accommodation. "'61 This
case affirms the role that reasonable accommodation plays in determining whether a claimant is a "qualified individual with a disability." 62
Ill. NAWROT V. CPC INTERN ATJONAL

A. Facts
Ralph Nawrot ("Nawrot") began working for CPC International, now
known as Bestfoods, Inc. ("Bestfoods"), in 1976.63 Nawrot was em-

54.
53.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
See id at 798.
See id at 799-800.
See id at 802-03.
See id at 797-98, 805-06.
/d at 798.
42U.S.C.912111(8)(1994).
See Nawrot, No. 99 C 630, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973, *4 (N.D. IlL June 21, 2000).
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ployed as a warehouse supervisor for Bestfoods. 64 He is a diabetic and
sufferer of hypoglycemia who uses insulin and food to control his blood
sugar level. 65 There was a dispute over whether Bestfoods allowed Nawrot to take breaks to monitor his blood sugar level throughout his employment. 66
In 1995, another Bestfoods employee complained of three comments
Nawrot had made concerning her religion. 67 In 1996, other employees
accused Nawrot of embarrassing one supervisor and shouting at other
employees. 68 On February 19, 1997, Nawrot refused to shake hands with
a new employee, telling her, "I would shake your hand but I just went to
the bathroom and did not wash my hands." 69 Nawrot provided his plant
manager with a note from his doctor indicating that Nawrot's hypoglycemia had caused him to make the statement, but the plant manager gave
Nawrot a written warning indicating that "[f]uture occurrences of this or
similar behavior will result in your termination." 70
Beginning in January 1997, Nawrot began requesting permission to
take frequent short breaks because he was having more trouble with his
hypoglycemic reactions. 71 Nawrot's supervisors did not grant that request, and Nawrot took a medical leave of absence. 72 In the application
for that leave, Nawrot's doctor indicated that hypoglycemia had caused
Nawrot's inappropriate behavior, including the February 19, 1997 incident.73
Nawrot continued to request short breaks, but his supervisors recommended either transferring to the refinery or taking a short term disability leave and then applying for a long term disability leave. 74 Nawrot
declined both options because he knew that the refinery was going to be
closed soon and because he was concerned about losing his job if he did
not qualify for a long term disability leave. 75 Nawrot's doctor indicated
that he could return to work in April 1997, but Bestfoods prevented him
from returning to work until June 1997. 76 Nawrot continued to request

64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.
S<'eid
See id at *4-5.
See id at *5.
See id at *6-7.
!d at *7.
!d at *R.
See id
See id at *S-9.
See id at *9.
Seeid
S<'e id at *9-1 0.
Seeid
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accommodations to allow him to regulate his blood sugar at work, but
alleged that he never received an affirmative response. 77
In 1998, other employees complained of several instances of inappropriate behavior by Nawrot.n One employee accused Nawrot of yelling at her and grabbing and twisting her arrn. 79 Nawrot admitted confronting that employee but denied touching her. 80 Because of allegations
that Nawrot was stalking and soliciting an employee that he had previously helped with an arbitration claim, a supervisor advised Nawrot to
refrain from contact with that employee, who continued to file com.
.
N awrot. XI
p !amts
agamst
In August 1998, Nawrot took a two-week vacation, during which
time Bestfoods completed its investigation of the allegedly stalked employee's complaints, concluding "that Nawrot had ignored the order to
avoid contact with [her, and] that he had harassed her, and that Nawrot
had assisted her with the arbitration case against Bestfoods." 82 Bestfoods
terminated Nawrot on August 24, 1998. 83 After receiving a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC, Nawrot brought a suit in federal district court alleging that Bestfoods violated both the disparate treatment and reasonable accommodation components of the ADA. 84 The suit also alleged
violations of the retaliation provisions of the ADA 85 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 as well as violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 87

B. The Court's Reasoning
The court granted Bestfoods' motion for summary judgment on all
counts. 88 The ADA analysis focused on whether Nawrot was a "qualified
individual with a disability." 89 Because there was no dispute regarding
whether Nawrot was able to perform his employment duties, he satisfied
the "qualified individual" aspect. 90 Nawrot's claim that he was disabled

77
7X.
79.
XO.
XI.
E2.

X:l.
X4.
X5.
X6.
X7.
XX
X9.
90.

S'ee 1d at *10.
Sc-e id. at *12-13.
See"/.at*I2.
See id
See idat *!.>.
/J.at*l4.
Si'e id
Sel' id. at * 15.
42 lJ.S.C. ~ 122()](a) (1994).
42 U.S. C.~~ 2000c-20()](a) ( 1994).
29 U.S.C. ~~ 621-624 (1994); Nawrot. 2000 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS X973 at *I, 14.
See Nawrot. 2000 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS X973 at *2X.
!d. at * 15.
Sn• id
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rested on two grounds: "that he [was] substantially limited in the major
life activity of working," 91 and, in the alternative, "that he was regarded
as disabled." 92
The court first pointed out that it must analyze Nawrot's diabetes
"with reference to mitigating measures." 93 The court then noted that
Nawrot had experienced hypoglycemic reactions which had rendered
him unconscious or incoherent while at work, but concluded "that they
occurred when Nawrot was unable to successfully maintain his blood
94
sugar level." The court determined that those incidents did not qualify
Nawrot as disabled because they occurred "in the absence of corrective
measures" and had not prevented Nawrot from performing his duties
over the course of his employment. 95
Rejecting Nawrot's argument that he was "substantially limited in
the major life activity of working," 96 the court pointed out that while
Nawrot indicated classes of occupations in which he cannot work, his allegations did not discuss whether he would be precluded from those occupations with his diabetes and hypoglycemia in a corrected state. 97 The
court also stated that "[ w ]ithout establishing this fact, for which he bears
the burden of proof, Nawrot cannot withstand summary judgment."9 s
Turning to Nawrot's claims that he was regarded as disabled, the
court stated that to satisfy that test, the employer must perceive Nawrot
as unable to perform "a class or range of jobs." 99 The court ruled that
Nawrot had not satisfied that requirement. 100
The court's explanation of why Nawrot was not a "qualified individual with a disability" demonstrates a problem with the Sutton mitigation
rule. 101 Recognizing that "a question of material fact exists as to whether
Bestfoods prohibited Nawrot from controlling his diabetic condition," 102
the court pointed out that it was unable to reach that issue because Sutton
requires that Nawrot be evaluated in his corrected state. 103 The court
summed up the loophole created by the Sutton rule as follows: "the em91. !d. at * 16.
92. !d. at* I X.
93. !d. at* 16 (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 ( 1999)).
94. !d at *17.
95. /d.
96. !d. at * 16-1 X.
97. See id. at *17-IX.
9K !d. at* 18.
99. !d. at * 19.
100. See id.
94. 42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(X) (1994).
102. !d at *20.
103. See id.
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player strips the plaintiff of all ameliorative measures, but in court, the
judge pretends that the plaintiff is always clothed with those measures."104 The court pointed out that while the Supreme Court in Sutton
noted that the "regarded as" prong might provide some relief to plaintiffs, 105 that prong did not help Nawrot. \(16 The court evaluated and dismissed all the other claims together. 107
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Nawrot Demonstrates the Loophole
The summary judgment in Nawrot demonstrates a loophole for employers that the bifurcation of the ADA qualification test creates in context of the mitigation requirements from Sutton. Under the first prong of
the qualification test, the court ruled that Nawrot was not disabled because he was able to utilize mitigating measures. 10 x However, part of that
mitigation required Nawrot to control his diabetes with insulin and
food. 109 While Nawrot alleged that Bestfoods prevented him from utilizing those mitigating measures by preventing him from taking breaks, because of the bifurcation of the qualification test the court could not address the merits of that claim. 110 That test required the court to rule that
because Nawrot could, under ideal circumstances, mitigate his condition
through insulin and food, the case could not proceed. 111 The court could
not advance to other issues, such as whether Nawrot's requested accommodation constituted a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA, or
whether Nawrot had a disability in his actual condition while Bestfoods
was preventing him from utilizing his mitigating measures.

B. This Loophole Allows Employers to Discriminate
Nawrot's circumstances are comparable to a hypothetical situation in
which an employee at a manufacturing plant has severe myopia, as did

104.
I 05.
I 06.
I 07.

/d. at *21.

Su: id See also Sutton. 527 U.S. at 490.
See Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS WJ73 at *22.
S'ee id at *22-28. Nawrot's other claims were hased on allegations that his termination

was retaliatory.
I OK s,e Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973 at* 17-18.

I 09. See id at *4.
I I 0. See id at *20 ("'Here. a question of material h1et exists as to whether llestl(lods prohibited Nawrot from controlling his diabetic condition. Yet according to .'>'ullon, this court cannot reach
the question of discrimination because Nawrot is not deemed disabled when viewed in his corrected
state.").
I I I Se" id at * 19-20.
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the plaintiffs in Sutton, but is able to perform the "essential functions" of
her job through the use of a corrective lenses. Under this loophole, her
employer could arbitrarily prevent her from using the corrective lenses at
the plant and then terminate her because she cannot perform her job
without them. Under the bifurcated qualification test and the mitigation
requirements from Sutton, this employee would be barred from bringing
a claim under the ADA. Under Sutton, individuals with myopia who can
correct that condition probably do not qualify as disabled for ADA purposes.112 Under the bifurcated qualification test, the inquiry ends there. A
court is unable to evaluate whether allowing the employee to use the corrective lenses would constitute a "reasonable accommodation" under the
ADA, or whether the employee has a disability while being prevented
from using corrective lenses.
C. Single Qualification Test Eliminates the Loophole

A single qualification test, combining the first two requirements for a
prima facie case into a single evaluation, 113 could close this loophole for
employers without affecting other ADA cases. Under this test, a court
would determine whether a claimant is a "qualified individual with a disability"114 under a single evaluation. The court would evaluate whether
the claimant has a disabiliti 15 in context of whether the claimant is a
"qualified individual," meaning that the claimant, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em. . "116
p1oyment positiOn.
This single qualification test would allow courts to consider mitigation and reasonable accommodation in concert. A claimant whose condition is not a disability because she can utilize mitigating measures to control her condition would be a "qualified individual with a disability" 117 if
the employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations, preventing her
from utilizing those measures. 11 x This approach would still require the
claimant's condition, in the state created by the employer's accommodation or failure to accommodate, to meet the ADA definition of "disability."119 The court would not evaluate the claimant based on the mitigation
112. Sci' 5iutton. 527 U.S. at 488-89.
113. S!'e supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
114. 42U.S.C.912lll(X)(l994).
I 15. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
117. Jd
II X. This inquiry would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the corrective measures she is
requesting the employer to allow her to make fall within the limits of reasonable accommodation.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
I 19. SCI! supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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she could hypothetically utilize, but based on the mitigation the claimant's employer allows her to utilize. This test bases the evaluation on the
claimant's actual condition rather than her hypothetical or potential condition.
Nevertheless, under this approach Nawrot would not necessarily
have survived summary judgment. The court indicated that it was unable
to address whether Bestfoods discriminated against Nawrot by preventing him from taking breaks or whether those requested breaks constituted
reasonable accommodation. 120 The court also gave a cursory evaluation
of whether Nawrot was a "qualified individual" without evaluating the
121
role that reasonable accommodation plays in that determination. Using
a single qualification test, the court could have evaluated whether Bestfoods' failure to reasonably accommodate Nawrot created a condition in
which Nawrot's impairments constituted a disability.
The court might have determined that the breaks Nawrot was requesting to monitor his diabetes did not constitute a reasonable accommodation. Additionally, the court might have determined that even while
being prevented from taking breaks Nawrot still did not have a disability.
However, under the bifurcated qualification test, the court was not able
to address these crucial questions.
Under a single qualification test, the outcome would not have been
certain. The facts warranted more than the cursory evaluation that the bifurcated qualification test required, which mandated the conclusion that
because diabetes is controllable, Nawrot was not disabled. The bifurcated
qualification approach essentially creates a per se rule, excluding every
condition that can be controlled from disability status, regardless of individual circumstances that might prevent an individual from utilizing the
mitigation. While the single qualification test would not solve this problem for all individuals with a disability who do not usc potential mitigating measures, it would at least enable an individual whose employer prevents her from utilizing mitigating measures to have a greater chance of
surviving summary judgment in her ADA claim. 122

120. See supra note I 00 and accompanying text.
121. Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS R973 at *15.
122. Another case where the single qualification test might have provided a more appropriate
evaluation is Hein v. All America Plvwood Co. Inc., 232 F.3d 4R2 (6th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff, a
truck driver who used blood pressure medication, alleged that he had been terminated because he
refused to make a delivery that was longer than his normal schedule and would have caused him to
run out of his blood pressure medication before the delivery was complete. Sec id. at 4X5-R7. The
court evaluated the plaintiff in his medicated state, concluding that it was the plaintiff's own fiJU!t
that he would have run out of medication during the delivery, and holding that the plaintiff was not
disabled under the ADA because he was not disabled in his medicated state . •')cc id. at 4X7-XX. It certainly would have been more appropriate fix the court to apply the single qualification test and
evaluate whether the plaintiff was disabled in context of whether the plaintifrs request to avoid the
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Just as the outcome in Nawrot under the single qualification test
would not have been certain, this approach would not create the potential
for significantly increased litigation. Plaintiffs would still have to establish that they meet all of the requirements to be a "qualified individual
with a disability." 123 This approach likely would not change the outcome
in a great number of cases. It would, however, open the potential to correct one injustice that currently cannot be corrected under the ADA,
where an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations to allow
an employee to manage a controllable condition.

D. The Single

Qual~fication

Test is Consistent with the Text of the ADA

The text of the ADA supports the single qualification test. While the
statute provides a definition of "disability," 124 it does not establish that
definition as the threshold question that courts have interpreted it to be.
That definition appears in the introductory sections of the ADA, not in
Title I, which contains the provisions relating to employment discrimination. However, Title I of the ADA clearly establishes a broader threshold
question for a claimant: whether she is a "qualified individual with a disability."125 This phrase is more properly considered in its entirety, considering how "qualified" and "disability" relate to each other. The bifurcated qualification test, however, creates two categories of individuals
with a disability: ( 1) individuals with a disability and (2) qualified individuals with a disability.
This bifurcated qualification test can result in a plaintiff who fits the
second category because her employer fails to reasonably accommodate
her essential mitigating measures, but loses at summary judgment because those mitigating measures are hypothetically available, and thus
she does not fit the more restricted definition of the first category. The
statute, on its face, does not establish two categories of disabled persons.
The definition of disability is positioned in the statute so that it is most
reasonably read as a supplement to the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" 126 contained in Title I.
The tendency of the courts to utilize the statutory definition of disability as the threshold question may be the result of inadequate apprelonger delivery was a reasonable accommodation under ADA guidelines. By applying the bifurcated
qualification test, the court was able to avoid the issue of whether the plaintiffs request was a reasonable accommodation, tersely concluding that the plaintiffs circumstances were his own fault
without evaluating those circumstances under reasonable accommodation guidelines.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8). "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S. C. § 12112(a) ( 1994).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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ciation of a fundamental difference between disability discrimination and
other areas of discrimination. A claimant who is a member of a protected
class for race or age discrimination is generally a static member of that
class. The group of individuals Congress designed the ADA to protect is
much less static. An individual's physical or mental condition may
change from day to day. General changes in technology and treatment
procedures as well as specific changes in an individual's financial status
or employment conditions can drastically alter that individual's ability to
employ mitigating measures. The drafters of the ADA demonstrated their
understanding of this reality by defining a "qualified individual with a
127
disability" to include consideration of reasonable accommodation. The
Supreme Court also has pointed out this reality in recent decisions.
E. The Single Qualification Test is Consistent with Recent Supreme

Court Decisions
While the Supreme Court has never made reasonable accommodations by an employer a factor in the determination of whether an employee has a disability, the reasoning from recent Supreme Court decisions lends some support to the single qualification test. The Court
addressed the role of reasonable accommodation in defining a "qualified
individual with a disability" in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
Corp.m Pointing out the differences between the appropriate evaluations
for an ADA plaintiff and an applicant for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, the Court noted that "the ADA defines a 'qualified individual' to include a disabled person 'who ... can perform the essential
functions' of her job 'with reasonable accommodation."' 129 Whether an
employer provides reasonable accommodations to allow an employee
with a disability to utilize mitigating measures is clearly a factor in determining whether that employee is a "qualified individual." 130
As one of the justifications for applying the mitigation standard in
Sutton, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the ADA "is properly read as
requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." 131 One author,
while arguing that employers should not consider mitigating measures
that employees choose not to utilize, pointed out that "[ o ]ne thing seems
evident from the [Sutton Trilogy]; it is the actual condition that the employee presents herself in at the time of consideration which is pertinent
127. See42U.S.C§12111(8).
128. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
129. /d. at 803 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1 (8)).
130. 42U.S.C.§ 12111(8).
131. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 ( 1999).
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to the disability inquiry." 132 Where an employer fails to reasonably accommodate an individual and prevents her from utilizing mitigating
measures, the employee clearly is presently disabled, and a court could
only consider the employee not to be disabled in a potential or hypothetical sense.

1. Single qualification test treats individuals as individuals
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry." 133 She also noted
that whether an individual is disabled "depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substan134
tially limiting." That "individualized inquiry" 135 does not seem consistent with a test that mandates that no controllable condition qualifies as a
disability. An individual's condition under the restrictions her employer
places on her is the relevant condition in which to evaluate the "limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces." 136 The per se rule
that the bifurcated qualification test promotes runs directly counter to another reason Justice O'Connor provided for the mitigation rule - to prevent individuals from being "treated as members of a group of people
with similar impairments, rather than as individuals." 137
In Albertson's, the Supreme Court pointed out that under the ADA
individuals must "prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent
of the limitation in terms of their own experience ... is substantial."m
An individual's "own expcrience" 139 certainly includes the restrictions
her employer places on her. The single qualification test is consistent
with the reasoning in Sutton and Albertson's. The test simply combines
the mitigation requirements for defining a disability the Supreme Court
articulated in Sutton with the requirement the Court noted in Cleveland
that the determination of whether an individual is a "qualified individ.
. o f w het her her emp Ioyer provt.des reasonua1"140 reqmres
const'd eratiOn
able accommodations. These two standards easily fit together into a single qualification test to determine whether a claimant is a "qualified
individual with a disability." 141

135.

139.
140.
141.

132. Dickinson, supra note I X, at 39g_
133. Sutton, 527 U.S. at. 4R3.
134. ld at 488.
!d. at 4X3.
136. !d. Sc>e Dickinson, supru note 18, at 400-0 I.
137. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4g3-84.
138. A/her/son's, Inc. v. Kirkinghurg, 527 U.S. 567 ( 1999).
ld
42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(g) (1994).
!d
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2. Per se rules are inappropriate
The Supreme Court has declined to establish a per se rule for defining a disability under the ADA in another context. While the Court in
1998 decided that HIV infection in a particular case was a disability under the ADA, the Court declined to determine "whether HIV infection is
a per se disability under the ADA." 142 While ruling that HIV infection
substantially limited the plaintiff in the major life activity of reproduction, 143 by declining to establish a per se rule for HIV infection, the Court
implied that the necessary individual inquiry might be different under
144
Other federal court decisions show that similar
other circumstances.
conditions may qualify as a disability under the ADA in some scenarios,
but not in others. 145 These cases further demonstrate that a per se rule is
inappropriate in ADA cases. Such cases require an individualized inquiry
into the claimant's circumstances, including factors such as employer
policies that may prevent the claimant from utilizing corrective measures. While the bifurcated qualification test promotes a per se rule requiring that a controllable condition does not constitute a disability under the
ADA, the single qualification test better facilitates the individualized inquiry that is necessary in ADA claims, allowing a broader, more individualized inquiry into the claimant's particular circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Current federal court standards create a bifurcated qualification test
for ADA claimants to maintain an action for employment discrimination.
That test requires the claimant to establish first that she is disabled, in
light of any corrective measures, and then that she is a "qualified individual."146 The bifurcated qualification test essentially promotes a per se

142. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 ( 1998).
143. Seeid at637-41.
144. But see Jones v. Rehab. Hosp. of Ind., No. 00-0681-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1911884, at *8
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2000) (recognizing that the Supreme Court declined to establish a per se rule for
HIV infection under the ADA, but nevertheless holding that "both the agency interpretation of the
ADA and the Act's legislative history support the conclusion that Congress intended HIV infection
to be a per se disability.").
I45. See, e.g., Gasser v. Ramsey, 125 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the side effects of the anticoagulant medication Coumadin qualified as a disability under the ADA); Samul v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2000 WL 1480890 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that in light of the plaintiffs
individual circumstances and activities, the side effects ofCoumadin were not sufficient to qualify as
a disability under the ADA); Boone v. Reno, 121 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that a
plaintiff who controlled her asthma through medication was not disabled under the ADA); Riebe v.
E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 2000 WL 1566516 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (holding that even while
using asthma medication, the plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to breathe, walk, and
run).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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rule mandating that no correctable condition can ever quality as a disability under the ADA. That test also allows an employer to prevent an
employee with a disability from utilizing mitigating measures, and prevents that employee from bringing an ADA claim under those circumstances. Under existing precedent there is no redress for that injustice
which is clearly, to borrow a phrase used by Justice O'Connor in a different context, "contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA." 147
Courts should adopt a single qualification test, considering whether
the claimant has a "disability" and whether the claimant is a "qualified
individual" in concert. In the case of an individual whose condition requires mitigating measures, this inquiry may involve an investigation
into whether the employer has provided reasonable accommodations to
allow the individual to utilize those measures. This test is consistent with
the text of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination against
a "qualified individual with a disability" and defines that phrase to include consideration of the reasonable accommodation the employer provides to that individual. 14 x This test is also consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent requiring an individualized evaluation of
claimants in ADA cases, evaluating claimants in their actual present
condition, rather than in a potential or hypothetical condition.
Most importantly, the single qualification test creates the potential to
correct an injustice. Currently, employers who prevent employees from
utilizing mitigating measures do not have to answer for that policy in any
forum. The proposed test would simply make employers accountable to
justify those actions. Courts could evaluate whether the requested accommodations constitute reasonable accommodations, where they now
must dismiss the case without addressing that issue. An enumerated purpose of the ADA is "the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." 149 While there are countless obstacles preventing the
fulfillment of that goal, the single qualification test is a simple way to
eliminate one of those obstacles.
Thad LeVar

147. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc .. 527 US 471,484 (1999).
14X.

Si'e supra text accompanying note 50.
1i 121 Ol(b)( I) ( 1994).

149. 42 U.S.C

